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The recently tabled parliamentary report on the South African Military Academy did
not pose the most fundamental question concerning the existence of the Military Aca-
demy: why is it important that soldiers should become academically educated? Does
sound military training not offer sufficient professional preparation for soldiers? This
article attempts to explain why soldiers need to be academically educated, while con-
sidering the influence of the “military mind” on the education of armed forces. The
underlying argument is that soldiers need to be empowered by acquiring a thorough
academic understanding of three particular environments: the higher order politico-
security environment, the defence environment, and the military environment. 
Denkende militêre personeel of militêre denke: die
opvoeding van die gewapende magte
Die onlangse parlementêre verslag oor die Suid-Afrikaanse Militêre Akademie het nie
aan die mees fundamentele vraag rakende die Militêre Akademie aandag gegee nie:
waarom is dit belangrik vir soldate om akademies opgevoed te word? Bied grondige
militêre opleiding nie voldoende professionele voorbereiding vir soldate nie? Dié artikel
poog dus om te verduidelik waarom dit noodsaaklik is dat soldate akademies opge-
voed moet word. Aandag word ook geskenk aan die invloed van die militêre denkwyse
op die opvoeding van die gewapende magte. Die onderliggende argument is dat akade-
miese opvoeding soldate moet bemagtig om drie omgewings te verstaan: die hoër orde
politiek-strategiese omgewing, die verdedigingsomgewing en die militêre omgewing.
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The South African Portfolio Committee on Defence recentlytabled a draft report on the South African Military Academyin the National Assembly. The report considered a wide range
of factors presently influencing the functioning of the South African
Military Academy and its disposition towards the future. In particular,
recommendations were made about the role and function of the Military
Academy, the representivity, qualifications and appointment of its staff,
its curriculum, its infrastructure and its resources (Asmal Report 2005).
However, the fundamental question as to whether South Africa really
needs an academic educational institution such as the Military Academy
for the education of its officers, was never posed. More particularly, it
was left in abeyance whether the expertise of military officers in South
Africa requires an academic education at all.
It is the purpose of this article to delineate the need for academic
education in armed forces in general. The article reports on a qualita-
tive descriptive analysis of the theoretical arguments underpinning the
need for a general scientific education for armed forces. As such, the em-
phasis is on the need for academic education by means of broad liberal
scientific academic curricula (ein gebildetes Offizierkorps) and not on the
need for professional military education that is usually provided by
the military itself (ein berufsgebildetes Offizierkorps) (Demeter 1965: 63-
108). The aim of the article, though, is not to justify the existence of
the Military Academy, but to highlight the most salient philosophical
arguments as to why officers need to be educated. The article is not based
on a quantitative approach, given the general philosophical nature of the
arguments. It is exploratory in nature and the expectation is that it will
be followed up with quantitative research.
It should also be noted that there is a school of thought which claims
that an armed force can be professional, and that all the relevant know-
ledge and skills are acquired on the strength of thorough training.
Mileham (2004: 80) argues that until recently most British officers
viewed the military profession in terms of “a career in soldiering”.
Mileham (2004: 71-2) is of the opinion that the British Army used to
view itself as an organisation whose function was largely practical and
based on common sense, and not necessarily on intellectual activity. Strachan
(1983: 1) also posited that the military profession is not primarily a
literate or academic  career. It is the challenge of an out-door life, not
that of desk-bound theory, that attracts young people to the military pro-
fession. This view is shared by the well-known Israeli military historian
and theorist, Martin van Creveldt. In his book The training of officers: from
military professionalism to irrelevance, Van Creveldt uses the armed forces
of Israel and Vietnam as examples to argue that armed forces need to
focus on training in the preparation of officers as military professionals
(Van Creveldt 1990: 2-3). The central argument in this article, though,
is that academic education is of primary concern to the military.
1. The fundamental nature of military education
Two fundamental considerations shape military professionalism and its
required expertise. Indeed, any serious examination or analysis of mi-
litary organisations, their existence, and their use in the form of mi-
litary power, is rooted in these two assumptions. The considerations are
not always very explicit, but their influence is nonetheless definitive.
In fact, these two characteristics distinguish the military profession
from other professions and from society in general.
The first characteristic is a politically unpopular idea, but one that
is fundamental to the existence of force and the ability to put it to
use. Militaries are created as instruments of war and must at all times
prepare themselves in a realistic way and be ready to apply force when-
ever they are called upon to do so. In short, the raison d’être of the mili-
tary is to fight and win wars. The general characteristics of the military
profession and its body of knowledge have been shaped by this primary
purpose of the military throughout modern history. What has changed
over time is the concept of what constitutes war, the successful use of
armed force(s), and the military’s relationship with society. It is this
fundamental nature of military force that Gray (1999a: 38) has in mind
when he warns that it is possible to shift the decent, liberal and scho-
larly focus on military, strategic and security affairs too far from the
battlefield. The military cause of winning and fighting wars gave rise
to a characteristic that is unique to the military profession: the military
professional, unlike other professionals, should prepare and be inclined
to give his or her life, if necessary, to achieve professional goals. This
consideration underpins the specific culture and ethos of the military
profession, namely the natural inclination of the military profession to-
wards the practical dimensions of soldiering, as well as the natural
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tension between military commanders, politicians, military staff officers
and military theorists (Gray 1999b: 11).
The second fundamental truth about military organisations and
power is the driving principle to serve society. In a democratic society,
military power should at all times be employed rationally, for a public
purpose and with public consent (Young 2004: 1). Without this impe-
rative the military organisation and the use of military power become
an end in itself and a self-destructive instrument of power. This is the
essential difference between violence and the use of military force.
Reynolds (1989: 29) describes this notion in philosophical terms when
he argues that “violence is either evil or irrational as a means of achieving
political ends when it escapes control and becomes indiscriminate”.
Consequently, the state is not only the controlling authority of armed
force; it also provides armed force with a rationale for existence. Clause-
witz (1976: 605) refers to this fundamental truth as the logic of war.
In short, the state provides the environment within which the military
profession must function:
An army is an emanation of the nation it serves, reflecting social,
political, and technological foundations. To study an army is to gain
insights into the nation it serves because a nation and its army are
interdependent. An army is not a mirror image of the nation, nor a
microcosm — the nation write small; it is in organization, purposes,
attitudes, and behavior conditioned by the sustaining state (Menard
1967: 5-6).
Accordingly, the profession of arms should, at all times, be examined
in the context of the political, economic and societal system from which
it evolves. The values, principles and character of the political system
within a country serve as the mould for the universal principles of
military professionalism within a particular country. Moreover, and unlike
other professions, the military profession has only one client: the state.
Together, these two notions demarcate the parameters and focus
of professional military expertise and the challenge of education in
armed forces. In the modern era, the military profession is confronted
by a variety of challenges. One of the most critical of these challenges
is the rising scepticism from the polity regarding issues of national
security (Sarkesian et al 1995: 74). In a situation where there is a clearly
defined (external) threat, the armed forces have a clear purpose that
reinforces and expands the notion of a profession committed to the
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service of a country. In a situation where the military is faced with a
variety of complex and difficult issues arising from the domestic and
international environments, that sense of purpose falls by the wayside.
In such a situation, the military serves as a reservoir of national skills
and should provide the intellectual skills for a variety of ill-defined
threats and challenges (Sarkesian et al 1995: 151-2, Desch 1996). Con-
sequently, the “fog of peace” could well be much more demanding to
the military profession than the reality of armed conflict. This “fog of
peace” is a fundamental consideration in the education of the military.
2. The rising need for education in armed forces 
since 1945
Since 1945, two factors dominated the education of military profes-
sionals, namely the significant expansion of civilian higher education
and the shifting definition of war (Van Creveldt 1990: 102). These two
factors were bolstered by a number of more or less plausible reasons
for the promotion of higher (academic) education among military pro-
fessionals. The first was the adoption by most armed forces of an “up
or out” personnel management system, in which most officers were ex-
pected to retire at a relatively young age and where most of these young
retired officers experienced difficulty in securing second careers. This gave
rise to a situation where officers were looking for pathways to prepare
for such second careers. The most obvious route was a recognisable
academic qualification. Foot (2001: 13) explains this phenomenon as follows
[...] as marriages happened, children appear and years seem to pass
more rapidly, attention shifts marginally to what time spent in the
military will produce by way of preparations for the next stage of an
individual’s career, beginning roughly any time from ages 30 to 50.
The introduction of nuclear weapons and the arrival of the age of
deterrence in the aftermath of the Second World War led to the de-
militarisation of war: the military dimensions of armed conflict were
de-emphasised in favour of the non-military dimensions. An under-
standing of the wider ramifications and implications on the use of
force became necessary (Van Creveldt 1990: 101-2). The fear that the
use of conventional weapons could lead to or escalate into a nuclear war
brought to the fore a limitation on the use of force in a conventional
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manner. This was one of the contributing factors in the rise of low-
intensity conflicts — so-called wars of national liberation. The political-
strategic emphasis and nature of these conflicts led to the re-invention
of a “new” military strategic school of thought: counter-insurgency.
In most theories about revolutionary wars and counter-insurgency, the
military dimensions of conflict are de-emphasised in favour of the
political, economic and political dimensions of the struggle (cf Fairbairn
1974, McCuen 1966, Thompson 1966). The rise of irregular warfare
was accompanied by an increasing emphasis, initially, on defence and,
later, on the security of the state. Ministries of Defence replaced Mi-
nistries of War while defence policies and later security policies replaced
military policies. The role of armed forces was extended to peacetime.
In addition, the introduction of the notion of security presupposed an
extension of defence and military-related matters to other spheres of
society. Within the framework of the Cold War, almost every concei-
vable aspect of human existence was securitised. The role of academic
education and the concomitant need to conceptualise these matters were
almost self-evident.
Van Creveldt (1991: 72-3) also argues that the post-1945 geo-strategic
situation necessitated armed forces all over the world to retain dis-
proportionately large numbers of middle-ranking officers in service.
The rationale was that, should another conflict break out, these officers
would act as the backbone of an accelerated mobilisation process. In
the strategic context of the Cold War, such an eventuality was always
a possibility. Over time, the numbers of these officers rose to a point
were they became a serious problem for armed forces, and questions
were being raised about what to do with them. Higher education as a
solution to these and other problems seemed to be a distinctly economic
concern. Officers who studied, required neither units to command, nor
equipment to run down. Sending officers to study was cheaper than
almost anything else they could be made to do.
3. A theoretical understanding of the need for 
educated armed forces
The discussion on the rise of education since 1945 outlines the prominence
of a number of geo-strategic and other reasons. The need for education in
armed forces should, however, always be seen in the context of the
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general need for education in societies world-wide and throughout
the ages. Yet, it is also true that the military has to produce its own
strategic thinkers if it wishes to be effective in the strategic realm.
Strategic effect is rooted in a thorough understanding of the complex
nature of strategy. The discussion by Gray (1999a: 24) of the seventeen
dimensions of strategy provides a solid theoretical framework for an
understanding of strategy and the need for education in armed forces.
The underlying argument is that cognitive excellence in each of the
dimensions of strategy contributes to overall strategic effectiveness.
Consequently, it may be argued that each of these dimensions provides
a reason why strategists in general and officers in particular, need to
be educated.
Figure 1: Security, defence and military knowledge
Gray’s seventeen dimensions of strategy are clustered into three
categories. The first category, “People and politics”, includes people,
society, culture, politics and ethics. The second category, “Preparation
for war”, comprises economics and logistics, defence organisation,
military administration, information and intelligence, strategic theory
and doctrine, and technology. The last category, “War proper”, consists
of military operations, command, geography, friction, the adversary, and
time. In comparing the different categories an interesting progression
is detected — at least from a military perspective (cf Figure 1). The
first category is almost on the periphery of the military world. The focus
is on those particular issues considered to be part of society in general
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and its security in particular. The second category demarcates the defence
realm. The emphasis is on those issues usually considered to be part of
the defence and the defence establishment of a country. The third cate-
gory is clearly at the centre of all military activities and emphasises
those issues that are related to the military’s primary role — warfighting
and the employment of armed force in general.
3.1 Security thinking: understanding the Clausewitzian 
trinity — government, society and armed forces
Education underpins the need for military forces to adapt to changing
strategic and operational environments. Consequently, Hauser et al (1996:
61) argue that militaries need to study the use of force in the context
of the social, political, economic, technological and moral factors that
influence military institutions and operations. In this particular argument,
the ability to cope with the ever-present threat of conflict and the need
to minimise the likelihood and severity of international violence form
the bedrock of the need for strategic and military knowledge. With the
acceptance of war and violence as constant features of the international
system, this outlook represents a very realistic view on the need for edu-
cation and knowledge of strategic and military affairs.
Contemplation of these influences is based on horizons and perspec-
tives not bound by military considerations, and encompasses the view
that political, psychological, social and economic factors are an integral
part of the use of force, or the threat to use force. The alternative to this
intellectual understanding of military affairs is a military isolated from
society and remote from the realities of the international security land-
scape (Sarkesian et al 1995: 158). This intellectual sophistication and
development cannot be provided by the military system in any other way
than through academic studies. The intellectual expertise and maturity
acquired through prolonged academic studies is the only vehicle providing
the understanding and sensitivity necessary to deal with the complex
security landscape and the increasingly complex military institution
(Sarkesian et al 1995: 18-9). Sarkesian et al (1995: 156) argue that educa-
tion offers a channel for mutual beneficial interaction between the military
and the broader society, and between the military and the academic com-
munity in particular. In the long term, this interaction benefits both the
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military and society. More specifically, it helps to break down rigid stereo-
types in broad society, as well as in the academic and the military worlds.
The strategic culture of a nation has a decisive influence on the de-
velopment of successful strategic courses of action, namely ways to
optimise the use of a nation’s resources to ensure its own security. Gray
(1999a: 129 & 141) emphasises that “[n]o one and no institution can
operate ‘beyond culture’” and “[...] culture is as culture does”. Strategic
culture not only shapes a country’s attitude towards the military instru-
ment of power; it also affects decisions about its employment. Stra-
tegic culture1 flows from the interplay between historical experience,
geography and political tradition (Drew & Snow 1988: 57). An indi-
vidual can only become historically-minded by means of extensive study,
thereby developing an in-depth understanding of geo-political matters.
Military power will always have a crucial role to play in the security
of states and the management of its defence — which is not necessarily
a warfighting role. From this perspective the role of the military is seen
as being constructive: to contribute to peace and security within socie-
ties, and not as a replacement for peace and security. The military and
strategic knowledge that originates from the above emphasises how mi-
litary power should prevent and end conflict in the international system.
This view of military and strategic affairs is rooted in the quest for know-
ledge on how military power could be used in a positive and respon-
sible manner. In the recent past, this line of thought has been associated
with the peace studies school of thought. Ideas, such as non-offensive
defence and non-threatening defence that rose to prominence in Europe
and elsewhere — also in South Africa — emanate from this school of
thought. These ideas represent an inherently idealistic outlook on the
need for knowledge on military and strategic affairs. In view of the na-
ture of South African security thinking, this argument alone should
feature very prominently in the need for the education of the military
in South Africa (Jordaan 2004).
1 Strategic culture is defined as “[...] the persisting socially transmitted ideas, atti-
tudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more
or less specific to a particular geographically-based security community that has
had a unique historical experience” (Gray 1999a: 131).
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This more positive role of military force in the security of states is
related to the kind of advice that militaries provide to governments.
There seems to be a rising need for enhanced military advice to govern-
ments. Governments expect militaries to provide better and more ima-
ginative strategic and policy alternatives. This could only be done if
militaries have the cognitive flexibility to move beyond the traditional
paradigm of military advice. Military and strategic education is the key
in this respect. Taylor & Bletz (1974: 254) describe the traditional
paradigm for military advice as follows:
In the past, military professionals have tended to view pessimistically
threats to national security [the ‘worst case syndrome’], to report
optimistically on military capabilities to get the job done [the ‘can
do syndrome’], and to show progress toward achieving objectives by
whatever measures their civilian masters establish.
The calibre of advice that military leaders provide should at all times
reflect an understanding that knowledge and ideas, and the ability to
generate them, are more important than weapons, economic potential,
political acumen or technological advantage. Foster (1996) avers that
it is imperative to develop, nurture and engage strategic thinkers on all
levels. He is of the opinion that strategically-minded officers are cri-
tical, creative, broad-gauged visionaries with the intellect to dissect the
status quo, grasp the bigger picture, discern important relationships
among events, generate imaginative possibilities for action, and operate
easily in the conceptual realm. Thus, he argues,
[...] any institution that relies on professionals for success and seeks
to maintain an authentic learning climate for individual growth
must require its members to read [to gain knowledge and insight],
discuss [to appreciate opposing views and subject their own to ri-
gorous debate], investigate [to learn how to ask good questions and
find defensible answers], and write [to structure thoughts and arti-
culate them clearly and coherently] (Foster 1996: 111).
These notions contain some of the essential characteristics of the edu-
cational process. It is impossible to perform these with a mere emphasis
on training. These indispensable elements empower and nurture stra-
tegic thinking. It is needed to develop the ability to grapple with the
underlying questions of “whether”, “why”, and “what if”s.
One of the defining characteristics of a post-modern military is a
growing civil-military gap. Militaries are becoming increasingly iso-
lated within societies and in the activities in which they engage (Hei-
neken & Gueli 2004). This growing civil-military gap is rooted in a
number of considerations. Most countries have done away with con-
scription, which used to be a vital link between the military and society
in general. The ending of conscription was accompanied by a growing
apathy in (Western) societies towards political and bureaucratic insti-
tutions in general, and the military in particular. With the end of the
Cold War and the democratisation of a significant number of coun-
tries in the world, militaries have been scaled down, to the extent that
people began to question the need for the continued existence of some
of these forces.2 Militaries have become increasingly less prominent
as an instrument of policy in international relations and the domestic
environment. This also holds true for its role in domestic policy-making
processes. It is believed that the events of 9/11 are due to change this
trend and that there would be a return of military force as a more
prominent instrument of international affairs. The present wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq are probably the first signs in this direction.
Betts (1997: 8) argues that civil-military relations will always ne-
cessitate an in-depth understanding of the checks and balances needed
for healthy relations between society and the military in general and
between the military and the government in particular. Feaver (1996:
154) summarises this as knowledge about the need to have protection
by the military as well as the need to have protection from the mili-
tary. A military can never discard its accountability in this regard and
should at all times be aware of the boundaries of its responsibility in
and towards society. It should, however, also be knowledgeable on when
and how to engage politicians actively as regards policy issues and
their application that concern the military. Such interaction should
be underpinned by a thorough understanding of the asymmetrical but
mutually beneficial relationship between the military and the polity.
Knowledge of civil-military relations is, therefore, important both within
and outside the military for a proper understanding of the role of the
military within and towards society. This is especially true of new
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2 This is also the case in South Africa. During a visit by the South African Par-
liamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence to the Military Academy on 19
January 2005 one of its members commented about members of the South African
Parliament who question the need for a defence force in South Africa.
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democratic societies like South Africa, situated in a region plagued by
bad civil-military relations.
The expertise of senior officers — military strategists — is defined
less by narrow knowledge and arcane technical, tactical and operational
detail. Neither is it defined in terms of dutiful obedience to authority.
It is, however, defined in terms of a sophisticated understanding of
complex (security) issues and a capacity to influence major events (Foster
1996: 112). Reddel (1998: xi), with reference to the military, argues
that no other profession incorporates such a wide range of decision-
making challenges posing profound implications for nations and their
societies. This holds true for the national, regional and international
strategic environments. Military decisions in the contemporary era have
a potential for ethical, economic, social and political ramifications far
beyond those of the nineteenth century, when military officers were more
narrowly focused and when weapons were far less lethal than today.
The trend of increasing complexity in decision-making is due to
continue as military forces are faced with advanced military techno-
logy, especially chemical, biological and nuclear technologies, and rapidly
changing and, sometimes, disintegrating societies. Reddel (1998: xi)
is therefore of the opinion that the question is not whether armed forces
should be educated; but rather what education could possibly prepare
officers to meet these challenges successfully to serve the security of
society. Officers need to be educated to deal with the demands of chan-
ging and complex security environments. This requires expertise beyond
the scope of the battlefield and other traditional military skills. Edu-
cation is the starting point for acquiring this indispensable expertise.
3.2 Defence thinking: preparing armed forces
Preparation for war delineates the need of military forces to be prepared
at all times to deploy on short notice or to react to emergencies that
may arise. The preparation of military forces is rooted in the avail-
ability of both military “hardware” and military “software”. States
normally take great care in the procurement of their military hardware
— ships, aircraft, tanks, etc. The software side of the coin, though, is
often neglected. The need for an updated military doctrine and an ethos
characterised by a fighting spirit often fall victim to a bureaucratised
peacetime military. An educated, informed and holistic understanding
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of what is needed for peacetime forces to be prepared is, thus, of para-
mount importance (Esterhuyse 2005).
Military “software” — doctrine — is rooted in theory. The need for
military education, specifically in peacetime, is closely linked to the need,
role and utility of military and strategic theory. Why should officers
be schooled in theory — the world of ideas? Gray (1999a: 35) points
out that wherever one looks in modern strategic history, testimony is
found of the influence of ideas. Clausewitz (1976: 578) explains:
Theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems,
nor can it mark the narrow path on which the sole solution is supposed
to lie by planting a hedge of principles on either side. But it can
give the mind insight into the great mass of phenomena and of their
relationships, then leave it free to rise into the higher realms of action.
It could be argued that theory serves a useful purpose to the extent
that it collects and organises the experiences and ideas of other men,
providing cues as to which of them may have a valid transfer value to
new and different situations. It also helps the practitioner to enlarge his/
her vision in an orderly, manageable and useful fashion — and then
to apply it to the reality with which s/he is faced (Wylie 1967: 35). Theory,
Strachan (1983: 2) points out, has two purposes: it provides an under-
standing of conflict and war and it provides insight into the military mind.
Stated differently, an intuitive understanding of military and strategic
matters, as opposed to a conscious and analytical understanding thereof,
negatively influences the military in two ways. First, it restricts the
vision of the strategists. A more general theoretical appreciation provides
a wider span to the vision of the strategist, namely his understanding of
conflict and war. Secondly, it blocks the exchange of ideas and almost
automatically inhibits appreciation of the ideas of others. “The remark-
able thing is not that there is so much disagreement in the Pentagon”,
Wylie (1967: 32) points out, “but that there is so much agreement”.
Soldiers are not strategic theorists; they are strategic practitioners.
They have to translate strategic theory into workable plans, from the
highest strategic and operational levels to the lowest tactical and tech-
nical levels. Doctrine is the means by which soldiers bridge this gap
between theory and reality. Sound doctrine is the only basis upon which
large numbers of people could be trained with equipment in standard
methods of behaviour to be predictable instruments of the military
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commander. Doctrine is written for and used on different levels in the
military to ensure that military forces are structured, trained and equipped
to apply technology (Sanderson 1998: 229). Doctrine needs to be written
not only on and for the joint strategic and operational levels, but it
is also needed within the different services on tactical and even lower
technical levels. Officers on all levels therefore need to be able to contri-
bute to the writing of military doctrine, both in terms of its content
and its physical writing. It stands to reason that the officer’s written
and analytical skills are of critical importance in this regard. Writing
doctrine is probably one of the most important tasks of an officer.
The importance of doctrinal writing centres on the need for doctrine
to be based on the correct historical lessons and strategic theories. Most
military disasters occur because of wrong lessons being learned, or the
right lessons being adhered to long after the lapse of their use-by date
(Smith 1998: 149).
The ability of an armed force to adapt to changing circumstances
and to shape itself for future eventualities is rooted in the need and
capability for research on contemporary and future security, defence
and military issues. In short, research is needed to incorporate all the
relevant lessons of the past, while preparing the armed forces for cur-
rent demands and likely future challenges. This is especially true in
rapidly changing technological, political and strategic environments.
Fabyanic (1986) argues that research and writing constitute one of the
“four pillars of wisdom” in armed forces. Without research, Fabyanic
claims, there can be no in-depth understanding of war. He argues that
the primary objective of research and writing is to put war in a clearer
focus so that efforts to deter or fight could be made consistent with
war as it occurs. A constant re-examination of war is essential for the
professional officer for several reasons, the most important of which
is that “[...] every age [has] its own kind of war, its own limiting con-
ditions, and its own particular preconditions” (Fabyanic 1986 quoting
Clausewitz). It is interesting to note how a large number of civilian
academics and theorists in the strategic studies and security environ-
ment have succeeded in influencing government and other policies
through research and writing. In South Africa, the two Pretoria-based
institutes, the Institute for Strategic Studies and the Institute for Se-
curity Studies, together with the ANC think-tank of the early 1990s,
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the Military Research Group (MRG), have been very prominent in the
re-orientation of governmental security and defence thinking in the
1990s (Jordaan 2004). This has happened to the extent that the military
almost abdicated its responsibility in this regard. There may, however,
be a theoretical explanation for this occurrence.
Militaries in general experience some difficulty in redefining them-
selves on a professional, institutional and personal level in terms of
the so-called post-modern military environment. The notion of post-
modern militaries arose in the aftermath of the Cold War. Academics
argue that the post-modern nature of military forces has a profound
influence on the nature and use of armed force. The progression towards
post-modern militaries is reflected in a wide array of issues: threat
perceptions, force structure, mission definition, the nature or type of
the soldier required, public attitude towards the military, media relations,
and the roles of civilian employees, women, homosexuals, military
spouses and conscientious objectors (Moskos et al 2000: 15). This re-
definition of military force, very prominent since the end of the Cold
War, occupies the (political and) military leaders of most countries of
the world. In South Africa in particular, this has led to an inward orga-
nisational focus with an emphasis on issues such as transformation,
restructuring and professionalisation. These transitional stresses, brought
along by the end of the Cold War and democratisation in many coun-
tries, led to a search for ways in which the military in general and military
professional in particular could deal with a wide variety of complica-
tions (Reddel 1998: xii-xiii). In the past, education has often been an
important tool to deal with such complexities.
Betts (1997: 8) emphasises that the nature of defence budgets affects
the fiscal, social and foreign affairs of a country. It is, on the one hand,
important for the military to have a ready expertise and an understand-
ing of these matters. On the other hand, it is essential that politicians
and society involved or interested in these affairs should not be igno-
rant about military affairs. The recent and ongoing debate on the pro-
curement of new weapon systems for the South African National De-
fence Force has again brought this point to the fore. The level of the
interest and debate on the strategic weapon packages are an important
indicator of the need for knowledge about military and strategic affairs
within the South African military. The nature and impact of defence
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and military decisions are accompanied by a need for management ex-
pertise. Military officers need to manage huge defence budgets and
sizeable amounts of manpower and material resources in the preparation
and conduct of military operations. The only way to inculcate such ex-
pertise lies in meeting an increasing and urgent need within militaries
for educated military management (Taylor & Bletz 1974: 255-65).
3.3 Military thinking: the use of armed force
Militaries, to a large extent, exist for one reason: organised armed force.
Their immediate task is to understand, prepare for and deter war. In
fact, the most fundamental and vital task of any professional officer is to
understand war. This task, Fabyanic argues, takes precedence over all
others. No officer, whatever his military occupation, can be exempted
from this responsibility. Fabyanic maintains that militaries in the con-
temporary era are confronted with the challenge that “[...] technical
skills took precedence over the ability to conduct war” (Fabyanic 1986).
Betts (1997: 7-8) argues that the possibility that conflict, or the
threat of conflict, would appear on the horizon again is always more
likely to happen than not. This is especially true in a war-torn continent
like Africa. According to Betts, this reason alone fully justifies “keeping
the flame burning”. Gray (1994: 360) argues along the same lines when
he emphasises two particular points: “bad times will always return”
and “there will always be thugs out there”. According to Gray, it is not
fashionable to emphasise this particular matter, but its political incor-
rectness renders it unusually important. Hence there is a need to have
military knowledge and expertise available in the event of conflict
recurring. Obviously, this need for the availability of knowledge is
underpinned by an understanding of the constantly evolving nature
of military and strategic doctrine based on changes in technology,
political doctrine, geo-politics and all other factors that may affect the
employment of force. Education is the only appropriate vehicle for ex-
ploring and preparing for such changes and future eventualities.
Betts (1997: 7) also highlights the need for knowledge about the
role of military forces in non-traditional scenarios. In brief, it is not
always clear what the role of the military should be in non-warfighting
scenarios. This is becoming increasingly important in an era empha-
sising the use of military forces not to bring about peace, but rather
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to keep the peace that has already been created. This also holds true
for South Africa against the background of a debate concerning the
so-called primary3 and secondary roles of the SANDF over the last
decade (Williams 1999). As Betts (1997: 7) explains in the context
of the USA, “confusion continues about what U.S. foreign policy should
expect military power to do for less vital interests”. With an increasing
emphasis on the collateral utility of military forces4 there is also a
growing need for education and knowledge about these activities and
of the environments within which force will be utilised in this regard.
Most militaries do not have wide-ranging experience in these domains
and in most cases a comprehensive doctrine for the preparation of forces
for these kinds of missions is not yet fully developed. The only remaining
alternative is to dispose of a theoretical approach, underpinned by the
need for research and education.
Dixon (1975: 27-9) argues that the employment of force is pri-
marily concerned with two types of activities — the delivery of energy
and the communication of information. The former is primarily a
mechanistic activity based on the warfighting skills of individuals,
their use of military hardware and their co-operation in the military.
Commanders are responsible to make decisions — based on intelligence
— about the who, where and when of employing the potential energy
available in military forces. It is important to understand that this
refers to both positive (constructive) and negative (destructive) energy
(Esterhuyse 2005). The decision of the commander is based on a large
conglomerate of facts about the strategic, operational and tactical si-
tuation, the enemy, own forces, geography and weather, to name but
a few. The commander should manage this information in such a way
that an informed, rational and sound decision can be made. These deci-
sions are rooted in the ability to manage large amounts of information,
on an institutional (the so-called C3I system)5 and individual level.
3 Defence against (foreign) aggression is considered as the primary role of armed
forces.
4 These missions are presently referred to under the umbrella term MOOTW
(Military Operations Other Than War).
5 Command, Control, Communications and Information.
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In the operating environment in particular, a set of complete know-
ledge on which to base decisions will never be available. Officers should
make deliberate efforts in peacetime to develop their cognitive abilities
to manage large amounts of information. More than that, they need to
develop their military intuition and imagination6 to help them con-
struct a full mental picture of situations where complete knowledge
is not available. Leser (1997) argues that intuition develops the officer’s
ability “[...] to see the battlefield without knowing all there is to know”.
Imagination, on the other hand, “[...] is the ability to consider pos-
sibilities that intuition does not see”. Whereas academic studies are
the principle means of acquiring the ability to manage information,
the development of a Fingerspitzengefühl, is derived from the interplay
between education, training and experience (Turlington 1987: 61).
Kohn (1998: 77) argues that in future military officers will need to
be “[...] broad and deep as well as tough and competent — men and
women of judgement, wisdom, and balance — to conduct more dis-
parate missions”. He argues that officers should develop the ability to
adjust to accelerated change not just in technology, but also in concept
and strategy. This will necessitate a larger proportion of “thinkers over
doers” in the world’s armed forces. Kohn also argues that the world is
entering a post-capitalist age in which knowledge is the only meaning-
ful resource. In this era, more than in the past, the decisions of officers,
particularly senior officers, will be the determining factor in the use of
armed force. Kohn is of the opinion that the education of officers should
make provision for foreign language proficiency, multi-cultural curricula,
rigorous historical study, specific abilities to understand technological
change, and an increased emphasis on research and writing, so that officers
could learn to think critically and to distinguish explicitly between
intellectual rigour and hogwash.
To conclude, officers need to be well-schooled in the skills and know-
ledge of the use of force. They should be able to assist in all matters of
strategy, policy, resource allocation and operations. Officers, in par-
ticular, need to be military leaders and skilled military specialists, open-
minded and adaptable, knowledgeable about military history and the
6 The German Wehrmacht of the Second World War referred to this ability as Finger-
spitzengefühl.
armed forces of the world, and well-versed in the complexities of bu-
reaucratic decision-making and the interests of the country. Further-
more, if military officers refrain from joining the public dialogue on
defence matters, and specifically if they fail to write for publications,
they abdicate the shaping of the military’s future to civilians (Todd
1992). This is what, indeed, happened in South Africa. The military
will only be able to fulfil their proper and full role if they are well
educated. The education of the military, though, has to contend with
one very particular issue — a phenomenon that is often referred to as
“the military mind”.
4. Educating the military mind?
Understanding the military’s disposition towards military knowledge
and expertise in general, and education in particular, requires an under-
standing of the military way of thinking. It is a way of thinking that
has often been described as a “military mind”. Huntington (1957), for
example, argues that there are three ways of understanding the “military
mind”. The first is a reflection of the ability or quality of the military
mind. Huntington (1957: 57) argues,
The intelligence, scope, and imagination of the professional soldier
have been compared unfavourably to the intelligence, scope, and
imagination of the lawyer, the businessman, the politician.
However, it is difficult to justify these kinds of claims. The second
understanding defines the attributes or qualities constituting a military
mind or personality. The military mind is thought to be “[...] disci-
plined, rigid, logical [and] scientific [...]” but not “[...] flexible, tolerant,
intuitive [and] emotional” (Huntington 1957: 60). The military mind,
Foster (1996: 112) maintains, largely discourages independent thought
and critical inquiry. He is of the opinion that pervasive doctrine, regu-
lations and operating procedures breed an orthodoxy in the military that
dispels any need for originality. Military officers are regarded victims
of a system that values non-objective advocacy, adheres to routine staff
procedures, and relies on rigid protocols. A third definition of the mili-
tary mind focuses on the attitudes, values and views of military men. To
be specific, it defines the distinctive and persistent habits of thought
that have developed within the military over a very long time. This places
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the emphasis on the intellectual roots or sources of the military mind.
The question arises as to whether it is possible to demarcate the in-
tellectual roots of the military way of thinking.
Baylis & Wirtz (2002: 6-7) argue that scholars studying strategy
— including soldiers — have the same intellectual roots, i e they belong
to the same intellectual tradition. They share a set of philosophical
underpinnings and assumptions about the nature of international po-
litical life, and the kind of reasoning which could best handle political-
military problems. These philosophical underpinnings and assumptions
are rooted in the realist school of thought. The realist approach to inter-
national politics could be summarised as a theory, which holds that
states struggle for power and security in an anarchical environment
(Lynne-Jones 2002: 54). This means that realists are pessimistic about
human nature, seeing people as “[...] inherently destructive, selfish,
competitive and aggressive” (Baylis & Wirtz 2002: 6). War, in their
view, is not something that can be eradicated. Rather, the ever-present
threat of conflict should be dealt with by minimising the likelihood
and severity of international violence. The harsh realities of world po-
litics are emphasised and the power and interests of states feature pro-
minently in their view of the world. They also have a pessimistic view
of world politics, with states being involved in a relentless competitive
struggle. Might is right in international relations, realists argue. As a
consequence, realists contend that international and regional institutions
have only a limited capacity to prevent international conflict. Realists
claim that the history of these institutions shows that when it really
mattered, they were not able or capable of acting against the interests
of their member states (Baylis & Wirtz 2002: 6).
Drew & Snow (1988: 47-62) outline a number of characteristics
underpinning realist military thinking. First, military thinking has a
fundamental nature. To be precise, armed forces have as their primary
objective the military security and protection of a country and its ci-
tizens from those with harmful intentions. Every citizen has an interest
in this basic purpose. Failure to live up to expectations in this regard
may well be fatal for a nation as a whole. In everyday political life,
this issue translates into the so-called guns vs butter debate (Henk 2004:
13-31). What percentage of the national budget needs to be spent on
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defence to secure the nation and how should the military utilise its budget
to optimise its capabilities?
Secondly, the external or foreign nature of its task directs military
thinking. Drew & Snow (1988: 48) argue that it is “[...] generally di-
rected towards foreign problems rather than domestics priorities”.
The foreign nature of the task is influenced by a lack of knowledge of
this realm. Defence officials are likely to be less knowledgeable about
the motives and influences of foreign governments and non-governmental
groups than is the case vis-à-vis domestic policies. This is even more
so in situations where the particular government or non-governmental
group is a potential adversary. The task is complicated by the fact that
militaries do not have control over events outside their country’s borders
and can only hope to influence foreign governments and groups (Drew
& Snow 1988: 48). The external nature of (traditional) military missions
also places support from the general public for such missions under
the spotlight, since the public may well have even less knowledge of
particular foreign issues and the role their military may be able to play
in resolving these issues.
Thirdly, military thinking is influenced by the negative nature of
the objectives being pursued (Drew & Snow 1988: 49-50). It may be
negative to the extent that the purpose is not so much to promote po-
sitive goals as it is to prevent others from engaging in hostile, harmful
actions. How does one demonstrate the success of negative objectives?
Positive objectives are relative easy to measure. An example would be
encouraging other states to become democracies. Is it possible to con-
clude that the present absence of conflict in Burundi could be ascribed
solely to the presence of the South African peace mission contingent?
Military thinking is, fourthly, characterised by “[...] a built-in con-
servative bias” (Drew & Snow 1988: 51). Military thinking is influenced
by the disastrous consequences of what may flow from a military mis-
calculation. The conservative nature of military thinking tends to
manifest itself in the political strategic domain as realist thinking. In
the operational realm, it reveals itself as the well-known worst-case
planning syndrome. In most instances, the worst-case planning syndrome
leads to an exaggeration of the threat beyond what it may actually be.
This may indeed have disastrous consequences if the worst-case pre-
parations exceed the capabilities and intentions of an adversary and,
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instead, become provocation. Worst-case planning could also be very
expensive and may lead to a focus on one particular scenario — con-
ventional war planning, for example (Drew & Snow 1988: 52).
On a lower level, however, the military mind is characterised by a
paradoxical nature: discipline and disunity (Besley 1973). Discipline
flows from the subordination of the military to governmental policy
and the need to execute it, while disunity is rooted in inter-service
rivalry between the different services and organisational entities. In
South Africa at present, for example, the “problem” of discipline is
manifested in a “follow the leader” mentality. This mentality has its roots
in political affiliations (support for the ruling ANC, to be specific)
on the one hand, and the need to have so-called “struggle credentials”
on the other hand (Kenkel 2003: 20). The result is a military organi-
sational climate of political correctness and an uncritical acceptance
of everything that is generated on higher levels.7 Any form of criticism,
initiative and originality is looked upon with disapproval. The end
result is an intellectually bankrupt or rotten military.
Military inter-service rivalry, however, is rooted in the difference
in strategic outlook of soldiers, airmen and sailors. The best-known
arguments in this regard are those of Wylie (1967: 48-57). He argues
that two factors shape the soldier’s conception of strategy: geography,
terrain in particular, and the soldier’s continuous and direct relation-
ship with combat. Armies are confined and constrained by the harsh
realities of the terrain that limit their speed and manoeuvrability. More-
over, in war, their central problem is often immediate, because the
enemy is right in front of them. As a result, the soldier’s conception of
war and strategy is sharply constrained, and often limited to the im-
mediate (battlefield) problem. The worldview of maritime forces is
constrained only by the shorelines of the world’s oceans. The air force’s
view of the world is limited only by the capabilities of its equipment and
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7 The military elite also forms part of the elite inner circle of ANC supporters in
the South African public sphere described by Du Plessis (Rapport 2005: 16). He
is of the opinion that this elite is “[...] so uit huis uit ANC [...] as wat kan kom”.
By referring to this elite, Du Plessis argues, “[d]ie kern hiervan is die magdom
van ministers, direkteurs-generaal, hoofde van staatskorporasies en ander politieke
aanstellings wat hul status en invloed ontleen aan die regeermag van die ANC.
En hul leërskare van ondergeskiktes”.
has expanded over time, as capabilities have expanded (Drew 1988). As
a consequence, the landpower strategist thinks in terms of theatres,
campaigns and battles,8 while the air power and maritime strategists
tend to think in terms of the whole world (Wylie 1967: 49).
The services also differ in their experience and conception of combat.
Airmen and sailors experience war as a separate series of encounters
from which they withdraw or which they pursue as deemed appro-
priate. Pilots would typically be able to drink cold beer every night
and navy officers would dress up for dinner! Once engaged, the soldier,
on the other hand, tends to stay in contact with the enemy. Each piece
of terrain is gained at a cost of life and effort. While the sailor and
airman tend to move through their respective geographical mediums —
water and air — their medium plays a relatively small role in the actual
use of force. For this reason, navies and air forces seek to exercise
control over their mediums while landpower occupies its medium.9 The
soldier’s conception of war and battle is very much Clausewitzian in
nature: the occupation of terrain and the destruction of the enemy in
battle in order to bring the war to a decisive end as rapidly as pos-
sible. The destruction of forces and the occupation of terrain take
place on the tactical and technical levels of war (Wylie 1967: 50-1).
Consequently, the soldier has a natural inclination to be a master of the
tactical domain with its emphasis on the development of military skills
through training. Considering the worldviews of navies and air forces,
as well as their respective focus on strategic blockade and strategic
bombing, they have a natural inclination towards the higher levels of
war and concomitantly a focus on education.
This reality is further underlined by the nature of the different forces.
Landpower is a people-centred instrument of military power. “Land-
power” Johnsen (1998: 9) argues, “more than the other components
of military power, depends on human interaction or innovation”. Mari-
time and air power, on the other hand, are technology-based instruments
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8 It is interesting to observe how this manifests itself in the concepts used by sol-
diers. For example, areas of operations, arreas of responsibility, areas of influence
and areas of interest.
9 For navies command, or at least control, of the sea, is an important step in the
use of sea power for strategic purposes, while air forces strive for air superiority
or some form of control of the airspace.
of power. As Johnsen (1998: 9) explains, “[a]ir and sea forces essentially
are built around weapon systems or support platforms”. One cannot
exercise any air power if there are no aircraft and one cannot dispose
of any maritime power in the absence of ships. To be true, one always
needs personnel to operate these technological platforms. But personnel
alone does not provide power in these domains that could typically
be expressed in terms of the example of a country with a navy of 50
ships or an air force of 500 aircraft, but an army of one million men.
In itself, this reflects something of the nature and difference between
the armed services. From an educational point of view, though, it is
understandable why sailors and airmen are more interested in technology-
related education and soldiers more in the so-called soft or human sciences.
There is also a difference in the role of land, air and maritime power
in the development of strategic effect. “The land matters most” Gray
(1999a: 212) argues and “defeat on land equals victory or defeat in
war”. Underlying this argument is the Clausewitzian notion that war
is an act of violence to compel the enemy to execute our will (Clause-
witz 1976: 75). Those people, who have to be compelled to do our will,
live on land. Consequently, strategic effect or strategic leverage is needed
on land, and only landpower can occupy terrain. Yarger (1999: 25) argues
that
[...] ultimately the resolution of armed conflict among nation states is
always predicated on land armies defeating the opposing armies and
physically occupying or threatening to occupy the enemy’s territory,
thereby controlling its government and its ability to resist one’s will.
The fact that no war has ever been won by maritime and air power
on their own further highlights this reality. Maritime and air power
in their purest forms are only enabling instruments: “[...] navies and air
forces are in support roles delivering men, supplies, and fire support
or creating conditions allowing landpower to be applied” (Yarger 1999:
25). This does not mean that air and maritime power are not of the
utmost importance as indirect coercive instruments. The reality, how-
ever, is that each of the different services has its own strategic outlook
and importance. This is demonstrated by the geo-strategic inclination of
countries to be either continental or maritime powers. Germany, for in-
stance, is a traditional continental power; Britain a traditional maritime
power. South Africa is without doubt a continental power.
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The education of the military mind has to contend with these dif-
ferences: the difference in strategic outlook or worldview, the difference
in outlook on combat, and the differences and unity in the strategic
effect of the different instruments of military power. In the end, mili-
tary education should reflect an understanding that the military, theo-
retical and strategic outlook of soldiers, sailors and airmen is coloured
by a green, blue or white lens.
On a more positive note, Richardson (1984: 24) argues that militaries
have to be military-minded if they seek the proficiency that will first
keep the peace and then prevail, should war occur. The military or
anyone else should not see the existence, development and nature of
a military mind as a negative trait. It ought to be actively developed
and pursued by militaries in a positive manner. The real question con-
cerns the nature of the military mind that needs to be cultivated.
Richardson (1984: 24) is of the opinion that it should be
[...] a mind steeped in the methods, procedures and fundamentals
of the profession, but bold, original and creative in their applica-
tion; a mind that is tactically competent and technological current
yet sensitive to the variable and incalculable human factors in war;
a mind that understands the uses of knowledge and intelligence, the
importance of fitness and the power of good character. It must be a
mind tempered by systematic training, broadened by progressive
education and deepened by increasing experience, both real and vica-
rious. In short, it must be a mind that rigorously and continuously
pursues mastery of the art of war.
From this discussion it should be clear that militaries share a
common framework of thinking about the world that surrounds them,
and more particularly about the role of military force and forces in the
world. Militaries have a unique approach to thinking about their task
in a world characterised by complexity and change. It is a way of think-
ing that tends to be conservative and to a certain extent also dogmatic.
However, the uniqueness of the military mind does not mean that it
cannot or should not be educated. Two particular historic views in this
regard are of particular importance. Frederick the Great referred to
his mule that had carried a pack on several campaigns, but remarked
that it never developed a better understanding of war because of that
role (Drew 1997: 44), while Bismarck argued that “fools say they learn
by experience — I prefer to learn by other people’s experience” (Liddell
Hart 1946: 10).
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5. Conclusion
The need for education in armed forces is rooted in a number of con-
siderations. In particular, soldiers need to have a cognitive and higher
order understanding of the fundamental nature of the military pro-
fession, of the nature of the politico-security, defence and military
worlds in which they operate, and of their own way of thinking — the
military mind. The fundamental nature of the military profession de-
marcates the boundaries of the military professional’s duty. It draws
the academic education of the military towards its primary role —
warfighting — and simultaneously assures that the military’s use of
organised violence is contained through subordination to society and
its polity. Yet the fundamental nature of the military profession also
influences the way soldiers think – how they use their military minds.
The realist or conservative thinking of the military mind, is an important
factor in the need for academic education in armed forces. A broad
liberal academic education is an important catalyst in influencing the
military mind to contemplate the higher order security, defence and
military considerations in the execution of officers’ daily duty.
Complexity characterises the modern politico-security, defence and
military worlds. The South African military — being part of the most
war-torn continent of the world — is not an exception in this regard.
There is without doubt an urgent need for the education of the military
in South Africa. This need becomes even more urgent if the socio-
economic and disadvantaged backgrounds of the majority of South African
officers are considered. In South Africa, this is an extremely important
notion, since unequal access to jobs and education — and consequently
extreme levels of income inequality — was one of the defining charac-
teristics of apartheid (Handley 2004: 196). Consequently, the provision
of military education underpins the success of the SANDF in the same
manner that the provision of education in general lies at the heart of
a successful new South Africa.
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